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SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF JAPANESE BANKS

Misao TATSUTA

*

1. Introduction
The extent to which Japanese banks are permitted to engage in securities
activities has been a touchy question historically, as the banking and securities
industries have waged a cutthroat struggle to obtain the advantage in the
context of somewhat blurred legal guidelines. However, this question affects
not only each industry's interest, but also affects capital market structure. For
example, the extent to which banks are permitted to engage in securities
activities relates to issues such as the protection of savers and investors,
corporate finance, competition among financial institutions, and fiscal policy.
Recently, the controversy over this question focused on whether banks
should be permitted to engage in underwriting and dealing in national bonds.
This issue arose because of a tremendous increase in the amount of national
bonds, which were issued to provide badly needed government financing. The
Securities and Exchange Law specifically excluded government bonds from the
general prohibition against banks' involvement in securities business [1]. The
Bank Law of 1927 [2], on the other hand, was not clear on this point. The Bank
Law of 1981 [3], after many changes in drafting, finally gave birth to an
express statutory provision regarding banks' involvement in securities business,
which was a product of compromise. The Securities and Exchange Law was
likewise amended with respect to securities activities by banks [4].
In light of these recent changes, this is a good time to review the historical
development of Japanese banks' securities activities. The history of overall
bank legislation is beyond the scope of this article and past statutes will be
referred to only when necessary to understand later changes.

2. Early legislation
The Meiji government enacted the National Bank Ordinance of 1872 for the
purpose of establishing the modern banking facilities needed for industrial
*
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development [5]. This statute, which, despite its name, governed privately
chartered banks, used the national banks in the United States as a model.
However, the statute reflected English banking philosophy as embodied in the
sound banking principle governing British clearing banks. Alexander Allan
Shand, an Englishman invited to work for the Japanese Treasury Department
at the time, had substantial influence in drafting the statute [6].
While the National Bank Ordinance of 1872 provided that the regular
business of banks, included dealings in notes and other securities [7], it
prohibited banks from engaging in industrial or commercial business and from
holding shares in such enterprises [8]. It is not clear to what extent national
banks were permitted to deal in securities. The 1872 National Bank Ordinance
required that banks maintain reserves for deposits [9], imposed lending limits
[10], and, as a rule, prohibited banks from sales of immovables [11].
The National Bank Ordinance of 1876 [12] clarified somewhat the extent to
which banks were permitted to engage in securities business. It permitted
banks to buy and sell government bonds as part of their regular business, but
prohibited them from engaging solely in such sales without also engaging in
lending, deposit-taking, and exchange business [13]. That ordinance retained
the earlier prohibition against banks' engaging in industrial or commercial
business and their holding shares in such enterprises [14]. Under the 1876
National Bank Ordinance banks participated in a public offering of government bonds as members of a selling group [15]. There was also a loophole in
the statutes prohibition against banks' holding shares which led to evasion
under the guise of holding shares as collateral for loans [16].
The Bank Ordinance of 1890 was enacted in order to bring unchartered
banks within the regulatory framework as well [17]. During the legislative
process, some pointed out that a number of unchartered banks were engaged in
non-banking business to the detriment of their creditors and shareholders [18].
However, the 1890 Ordinance did not prohibit banks' shareholding or nonbanking side business, but it did impose lending limits [19]. The 1916 amendment to the 1890 Ordinance added the requirement that banks obtain permission from the Finance Minister in order to engage in non-banking business
[20]. This permission was easily obtained, for over twenty banks engaged in
warehousing and several engaged in transportation [21].
Securities firms had not yet fully developed at that time and banks were the
central figures in underwriting debt securities, both government bonds and
corporate debentures. The prototype of the underwriting syndicate was molded
in 1910 when the government issued 100 million yen of 4% bonds. Fifteen
major banks formed a syndicate and underwrote seventy-five million yen of
the issue (the remainer was underwritten by the Bank of Japan) [22]. Major
securities firms also formed syndicates, but they acted as mere sub-underwriters [23]. Thus, it is fair to say that underwriting was not regarded as
non-banking business at that time.
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The panic of 1896 drove those banks that had held substantial shares or had
loaned heavily, holding shares as collateral, into severe difficulty because of
reductions in stock prices. This led to the promulgation of special statutes in
1897 and 1902 which provided for the establishment of long-term credit banks
[24]. Even after this development, however, ordinary banks did not choose to
specialize in purely commercial banking.

3. The Bank Law of 1927
A number of bank failures took place during the financial panic of the
mid- 1920s. The common cause of such failures was that these banks had taken
advantage of the repeal of lending limits by the 1895 amendment and loaned
heavily to their affiliated companies [25]. Many of the banks that failed had
concentrated their investments in specified companies by holding shares and
debentures, as well as making loans with or without shares as collateral [26].
The Bank Law of 1927 [271 appeared in the midst of this financial panic.
This law defined the regular business of banks to consist of deposit-taking,
money-lending, discounting of bills and notes, and exchange transactions [28].
It flatly prohibited banks from engaging in other business, except trust
business relating to secured debentures, safekeeping, or business incidental to
banking [29]. It also required that a managing director of a bank or a general
manager obtain the Finance Minister's permission to engage in the daily
business of other companies [30]. On the other hand, this law did not forbid
banks from holding shares in other companies, nor did it impose any lending
limit on loans, whether secured with shares or not.
The 1927 Bank Law survived for more than half a century, with minor
amendments to the text itself and extensive interpretation by means of
ministerial rules and administrative guidance issued thereunder. One of the
reasons this law lived such a long life was that it was formulated to be quite
flexible. Nevertheless, the 1927 Bank Law was the cause of the later controversies regarding securities activities of banks. The recent arguments referred to
the legislative history of the 1927 law, as well as to policy considerations
regarding the eventual effects of banks' securities business. Thus, it would be
appropriate to glance at the legislative history of the 1927 Bank Law.
The question under consideration during the legislative process was whether
or not and to what extent "business incidental to banking" covered securities
activities. To the extent this question was affirmatively answered, banks could
engage in securities business without the necessity of getting approval from the
Finance Minister. If the answer was negative, there was no way for banks to
engage in securities business because the law lacked a provision authorizing the
minister to give banks approval to engage in non-banking business.
This question was repeatedly discussed during the committee sessions in the
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Diet. The Ministry of Finance officials did not take consistent positions when
they replied to questions regarding the construction of the bill's provision on
"business incidental to banking", which became law without any change. At
the outset, the officials took the position that dealing in and underwriting
securities would fall within "business incidental to banking" if these activities
were necessary or useful for regular banking business [31]. One committee
member argued for the necessity of legitimizing banks' dealings in debt
securities, pointing out that banks then held debt securities amounting to
approximately 1.9 billion yen in their portfolios or as collateral, whereas their
aggregate paid-in capital was 1.5-1.6 billion yen and total deposits were
around 8 billion yen. The Ministry of Finance officials acceded to this
argument [32]. In the end they admitted that it was virtually impossible to
draw a line between dealings falling within "business incidental to banking"
and those beyond that category, regardless of the amount [33].
Under the Bank Law of 1927, especially during the recession period after
1929, securities firms found it more and more difficult to act as managing
underwriters. Members of underwriting syndicates were by and large fixed:
sixteen banks, including three long-term credit banks, such as Japan Industrial
Bank, were the dominant figures [34].
When the Securities Underwriters Law of 1938 [35] first introduced a license
requirement for underwriters, forty-four banks, thirteen trust companies, eight
securities firms, and one other company were engaging in the underwriting
business. While the securities firms were licensed pursuant to this law, other
underwriters were exempted on the ground that they were already supervised
pursuant to other regulatory statutes such as the Bank Law of 1927 [36]. The
Securities Broker-Dealer Law of 1938 [37] also exempted banks and other
already regulated firms on the same grounds [38].
As of 1936, underwriting by the eight securities firms accounted for approximately a quarter of the total corporate debentures issued [39] and
exempted underwriters, such as banks, accounted for three-quarters. Moreover,
since secured debentures became the rule as a result of a movement to banish
unsound issues, trustees underwrote the issues and securities firms again were
reduced to mere sub-underwriters. Beginning around 1940, underwriting syndicates for corporate debentures consisted exclusively of major banks and trust
companies [40].

4. Post-war legislation
The Bank Law of 1927 itself survived the occupation period after World
War II. However, antimonopoly and securities legislation, both unknown to
pre-war Japan, put fetters on the securities activities of banks.
The Antimonopoly Law of 1947 [41]. in its original version, prohibited
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financial institutions, including securities firms, from acquiring shares in rival
financial institutions [42]. It also prohibited financial institutions with gross
assets exceeding five million yen from acquiring and holding more than 5% of
the outstanding shares in any company [43]. The acquisition of shares by
financial institutions, other than securities firms, through underwriting for the
purpose of distribution was among the exceptions from these prohibitions [44].
Thus, we can infer that underwriting by banks was not illegal at that ime. The
1953 amendment [45] expanded the provision concerning acquisition of shares
in rival institutions into a general provision prohibiting any corporation from
acquiring shares in other corporations if such acquisition would substantially
lessen competition [46]; it relaxed the 5% restriction to 107 [47]; at the same
time, it repealed the aforementioned exemption for acquisition of shares
through underwriting.
The limit for banks' shareholdings in other corporations was again reduced
to 5% of the outstanding shares by the 1977 amendment to the Antimonopoly
Law of 1947 [48]. This restriction, needless to say, is not based upon the
philosophy of sound banking, but upon a policy of maintaining competition by
preventing banks from exerting control over industries. This restriction, if
accompanied by imposition of lending limits, does foster banks' soundness,
however, by preventing the concentration of bank funds in specified enterprises [49]. On the other hand, since such a restriction does not refer to a
proportion of the bank's total assets, a bank may be substantially affected by
stock market fluctuations if it invests in many corporations.
The Securities and Exchange Law of 1948 [501 introduced a controversial
provision prohibiting banks and other financial institutions from engaging in
securities business [51]. It exempts the following transaction from this prohibition: (1) selling and buying securities for the account of customers pursuant to
their written orders; and (2) selling and buying securities for the purpose of
investment, or for the account of a beneficiary based upon a trust agreement,
in accordance with provisions of other statutes [52]. In addition, dealings in
national government bonds, municipal bonds, and corporate debentures and
other debt securities guaranteed by the government are totally exempted from
the prohibition [53]. At the same time, "securities business" under the law, by
definition, excludes business done by financial institutions [54].
Although the above-mentioned provisions of Article 65 of the Securities and
Exchange Law were modeled after the U.S. Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 [55],
since Article 65 does not restrict banks' holding securities for investment
purpose, it cannot be said that the protection of depositors was the primary
purpose of that article [56]. An official at the time in the Securities Exchange
Commission, who might have been one of the draftsmen, stressed the importance of nurturing securities firms for the purpose of democratization of the
nation's economy by having banks abstain from securities business [57].
After promulgation of the Securities and Exchange Law, as its effective date
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drew near, the Federation of Bankers Associations and the Association of
Trust Companies petitioned the Securities Exchange Commission for a one
year postponement of the effective date of Article 65, on the ground, among
others, that their selling activity was needed for the then government agency
(S.C.L.C.) to dispose of unsold shares worth over 20 billion yen which had
been expropriated from zaibatsu families and holding companies as a result of
compulsory dissolution of zaibatsu combines [58]. The Federation of Securities
Dealers Associations was strongly opposed to such postponement on the
ground, among others, that it would only extend for one year the inadequate
protection of investors and depositors. This struggle ended in an amicable
settlement when the bank and trust groups withdrew their petitions after the
Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) interceded [59].
Around the time when the Securities and Exchange Law was enacted, a
separate statute was being drafted pursuant to the recommendation of the
occupation forces, which would have brought about complete segregation
between the banking and securities industries by means of restricting shareholdings and prohibiting interlocking directorates between these industries
[60]. This draft was dropped for reasons unknown to the writer.
The 1950 Law Concerning Issuance of Debentures by Banks [61] enabled
every bank to issue bank debentures (knzyi1sai) which was theretofore permissible only for long-term credit banks. This statute was epoch-making in that it
ended the policy of separating long-term financing from commercial banking
[62]. However, this statute was abolished two years later when the Long-Term
Credit Bank Law of 1952 [63] was enacted. Thus, the stage was set for a revival
of the banking system of pre-war times, with a significant difference, however,
in that big securities firms gained strength incomparable with pre-war days,
mainly because of Article 65 of the Securities and Exchange Law which
excluded banks from the underwriting business [64].
In connection with the bill which became the Long-Term Credit Bank Law
of 1952, there was considerably detailed discussion in the Diet as to the scope
of securities business permissible for banks [65]. Taking this discussion into
account, that statute clarified somewhat the extent to which long-term credit
banks were permitted to engage in securities business: long-term credit banks
could acquire securities in any manner, but they were not allowed to acquire
corporate shares or debt securities for the purpose of distribution without
government guaranty [66].
In summary, the Securities and Exchange Law did not prohibit banks from
dealing in government bonds, national or municipal. Although it may be
argued that banks could not engage in such business due to the restrictions
imposed by the Bank Law of 1927, there was no doubt that long-term credit
banks could lawfully underwrite and sell government bonds. Nevertheless,
banks, including long-term credit banks, abstained from engaging in such
business. This is because the Ministry of Finance, by means of so-called
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"administrative guidance" issued for the purpose of helping the securities
industry to develop, suggested that banks abstain [67].
The result has been that big securities companies have underwritten government bonds, obtaining underwriters' fees, while a large portion of each issue
has ended up in the hands of banks, some of which are members of the
underwriting syndicates. As for corporate debentures, banks have been acting
merely as trustees charged with protecting debenture holders and administering collateral [68]. Securities companies are not permitted to engage in these
kinds of activities [69]. In addition, banks have been holding substantial
portions of corporate debentures as investors. i.e. they purchase these securities that were underwritten by securities companies.

5. Recent controversies
Article 65 of the Securities and Exchange Law created problems from the
start. Even after the enactment of the Long-Term Credit Bank Law of 1952,
that provision often aroused controversies between the industries concerned.
Among the occasions that triggered controversies, two merit mentioning: (1)
the overseas expansion by both the securities and banking industries in the late
1960s and early 1970s; and (2) the market increase in the amount of government bond issues since the late 1970s that culminated in the recent statutory
amendments.
5. 1. Overseas expansion
In 1969, a European subsidiary of the Bank of Tokyo participated in
underwriting Honda debentures offered in Europe. Presidents of the "Big
Four" securities companies submitted a protest to the Finance Minister
questioning the legitimacy of such conduct. The Ministry of Finance responded by issuing an administrative guidance to the subsidiary advising it not
to engage in underwriting debentures issued by Japanese corporations [70].
In 1971, two international investment banks were established in London,
both of them being joint ventures formed by Japanese banks and securities
companies. Their business includes, among others, long- and medium-term
loans and securities underwriting [71]. Thus, banks are engaging in securities
business and securities companies are engaging in banking business through
these overseas offshoots. In addition to these, there is a host of joint ventures
formed by Japanese banks and foreign merchant banks for the purpose of
engaging in securities business. Also, securities companies participate in multinational banks. One of the above-mentioned London-based international
investment banks, in which Nomura Securities Company participates, restricts
its securities underwriting business by excluding underwriting of securities
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issued by corporations established pursuant to Japanese law [72]. This shows
Nomura's strength in relation to banks.
In 1974, the Ministry of Finance announced a policy of permitting overseas
subsidiaries of Japanese banks to engage in underwriting on two conditions:
(1) that the parent bank refrain from any help whatsoever with regard to the
subsidiary's underwriting activity; and (2) that the issuer of foreign currencydenominated debentures underwritten by the overseas subsidiary of the parent
bank employ the proceeds only abroad [73]. This policy may reflect a political
compromise rather than a theoretical consideration as to the extraterritorial
application of Japanese law.
5.2. Increase in government bond issues
In the 1970s, government bond issues considerably increased to cope with
increased budgetary needs arising when tax revenues failed to keep pace with
the budget as economic growth slowed down. Since banks were assigned to
subscribe for a certain portion of each issue, their holdings of government
bonds increased accordingly. In order to avoid depressing the market price of
government bonds, the Ministry of Finance dissuaded banks from disposing of
these bonds. The market price did fall, nevertheless, because the government
insisted on issuing bonds bearing low interest rates even though interest rates
had increased in general. This resulted in substantial losses to banks that
followed the evaluation rule of the Commercial Code, which requires that
bonds be valued at the current price if the current price is significantly lower
than the acquisition price and is not expected to recover [74]. Some banks
switched to evaluation on a historical cost basis, as permitted by a special
statute relating to evaluation of government bonds [75], so that they could
erase losses on the face of their balance sheets.
These circumstances spurred anew the banks' campaign to recover their lost
territory - underwriting and dealing in government bonds. By underwriting
they could earn fees. By dealing they could unload their holdings. Bank
customers would more likely purchase bonds if they could sell them back to
banks when necessary. The banks found support for their position in the
provision of the Securities and Exchange Law which explicitly exempts government bonds [76]. Under this provision, it was believed that banks could engage
in the government bond business, but they refrained from doing so because of
the Ministry of Finance's administrative guidance, which expanded the segregation between the securities and banking business based on the spirit of the
Securities and Exchange Law provision [77].
This common understanding was shared by Mr. Tanimura, President of the
Tokyo Stock Exchange. He argued that the legislative history of the Bank Law
of 1927 required a limited construction of the exemptive provision of the
Securities and Exchange Law along the following lines. Business relating to
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government bonds, notwithstanding the broad exemption in article 65, paragraph 2, of the Securities and Exchange statute, was confined to the scope
specifically exempted by the proviso clause, paragraph 1, of the same article,
i.e. selling and buying securities for customers' accounts pursuant to their
written orders, for the banks' own investment purposes, or for the account of a
beneficiary based upon a trust agreement [78]. The ground for his argument
was that business relating to government bonds was nothing but a "business
incidental to banking" within the meaning of the Bank Law of 1927 and that
the debates in the Diet showed that such business should be narrowly limited
[79].
Since Mr. Tanimura had experience in bank regulation as well, his argument
exerted considerable influence in the debate on this issue. His argument raised
the necessity of examining the extensive Diet records regarding the Bank Law
of 1927. An outstanding academician supported Mr. Tanimura's view [80],
whereas another prominent scholar disagreed, finding no grounds in the Diet
records to support any such argument [81]. The writer finds the latter viev
more persuasive. The position taken by the Ministry of Finance officials
changed to a great extent during the discussion in the Diet [82]. Therefore, it
would not be fair to rely on any one of the answers given by the officials
during the course of the discussion, except that given at the end, which
accorded a rather broad interpretation to the scope of "business incidental to
banking".
Moreover, if banks' business in government bonds is exempted only to the
extent stipulated by the proviso clause of article 65, paragraph 1, of the
Securities and Exchange Law, it would not make sense to have the provision
contained in paragraph 2 in addition to the proviso clause of paragraph 1.
Even if the Bank Law of 1927 should have been construed as Mr. Tanimura
argues, it was modified by virtue of the later enactment of the Securities and
Exchange Law of 1948. Unless this view is taken, the provision (article 65,
paragraph 2) added by the legislature would be without any force from the
outset.
Aside from statutory construction arguments, both the bank and securities
industries employed policy arguments as well. The banking industry contended
that banks' underwriting and dealing would help distribute government bonds
among the public at large, something that was badly needed for the national
economy [83]. The securities industry argued that government bonds had
already been well distributed among the general public through the securities
companies, and that allowing banks to engage in the government bond
business would open the door for their involvement in the securities business in
general, which would be sure to lead to banks controlling other industries as in
pre-war times [84]. Behind these controversies is visible a vehement struggle
between the two industries regarding their business interests, similar to that
seen in the United States [85]. The difference, however, is that in Japan the
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issue of protection of depositors never came to the forefront because banks
have been allowed to hold securities for their own investment purposes within
the limits imposed by the Antimonopoly Lav [86].

6. The new Bank Law of 1981
The Securities Council, an advisory body for the Finance Minister responsible for making proposals concerning amendments to the Securities and Exchange Law [87], had never touched upon the problem of banks' involvement
in securities dealings before it vaguely mentioned the necessity of examining
the question in its 1973 report [88]. The report was epoch-making in that it
broke the taboo, but the council did not even decide whether or not it should
commence examination of Article 65 of the Securities and Exchange Law [89].
It said virtually nothing about the issue.
When the overhaul and revision of the rather outdated Bank Law of 1927
was set in motion, the Financial System Investigation Council, also an advisory
body to the Finance Minister and responsible for making proposals for laws
relating to banks and other financial institutions, had to say something in
connection with this touchy issue. A subcommittee of that Council presented
the following proposal: as an accommodation, the acquisition of securities by
banks should be considered a part of the inherent business of banks, whereas
underwriting, dealing, and other securities business should be regarded as
"business incidental to banking" [90]. The plenary Council, however, did not
take any definite position on the issue, but rather left examination of the
subject to the Ministry of Finance staff [91].
The Securities Council, when it had to consider the issue in connection vith
amending the Securities and Exchange Law to conform to the eventual reform
of the Bank Law of 1927, also left the examination of the problem to the
Ministry of Finance staff, but hinted at its rather negative position with regard
to banks' dealing in government bonds [92]. Both the Financial System
Investigation Council and the Securities Council are composed of representatives of the industries concerned as well as academicians, so it may have been
difficult for them to take a specific position which would favor one of the two
industries concerned.
The Ministry of Finance set up the following basic principles when it began
drafting the new version of the Bank Law: (1) the new statute should have
express provisions on banks' business relating to public debt securities (national and municipal government bonds, and debt securities guaranteed by the
government); (2) banks' engagement in such business should be subject to a
licensing requirement pursuant to the Securities and Exchange Law and should
be governed by relevant provisions of that law; and (3) the above-mentioned
principles relate only to revision of the statutory provisions, and other consid-
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erations might govern when implementing them [93].
After many difficulties in attempting to fit the contentions of both the
banking and securities industries within the so-called three principles referred
to above, the new Bank Law [94] and amendments to the Securities and
Exchange Law [95] were promulgated on June 1. 1981, both of which took
effect on April 1, 1982.
The new Bank Law defines the term "bank" as a person who engages in the
banking business with a license granted by the Finance Minister [96]. The term
"banking business" in turn is defined as a business composed of either of the
following activities: (I) both taking deposits (or accumulating time deposits)
and making loans (or discounting bills and notes); or (2) engaging in exchange
transactions [97]. Thus, these activities are viewed as inherent banking business.
In addition to these activities of inherent banking business, a bank may
engage in any of several enumerated businesses as well as other business
incidental to the banking business [98]. Among the explicitly enumerated
businesses which are incidental to the banking business, the following are
especially relevant in connection with our topic: (I) sales of securities (confined to those made for the purpose of investment of those made on account of
customers upon their written orders) [99]; and (2) underwriting (except those
made for the purpose of distribution) of national government bonds, municipal
bonds or bonds with government guaranty, or handling of public offerings of
such underwritten bonds [100].
The new Bank Law also provides that a bank may, in addition to the
inherent banking business activities and business incidental to banking, engage
in underwriting, handling public offerings or secondary distributions of, sales
and other transactions in, national government bonds, municipal bonds, or
bonds with government guaranty, to the extent that such business does not
hinder its performance of inherent banking business activities [101]. On the
other hand, banks are prohibited from engaging in business other than those
permitted by the Bank Law, the Secured Debenture Trust Law [102], or other
statutes [103].
Thus, it is now clear that banks may engage in certain types of securities
business with regard to national government bonds, municipal bonds, and
bonds with government guaranty. However, in order for a bank to commence
or alter this kind of business (except those incidental to banking) to a
significant extent, it is necessary to obtain a license from the Finance Minister
[104]. Under the new Bank Law, such a license is required only "for the time
being". It is for this reason that this requirement is stipulated in the Supplementary Provisions instead of in the body of the law.
However, the Securities and Exchange Law, as amended at the same time as
the new Bank Law was enacted, requires a license without the "for the time
being" qualification [105]. In short, a bank must have a separate license
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whenever it engages in underwriting, selling, dealing, or brokering national
government bonds, municipal bonds, or bonds with a government guaranty.
The amended Securities and Exchange Law also made it clear that its relevant
provisions apply mutatis mutandis to banks doing business in such securities
[106]. The Finance Minister is empowered to inspect banks engaging in
government securities business when necessary for the protection of investors
[107]. Transactions by banks in other securities, such as corporate shares or
debentures, are permitted only where they are made for the purpose of
investment or based upon customers' written order, pursuant to the new Bank
Law as was discussed above [108].
According to both the new Bank law and the amended Securities and
Exchange Law, it is possible now for a bank to engage in certain securities
business by obtaining a license form the Finance Minister. However, it does
not seem likely that the Finance Minister will grant such licenses as soon as the
relevant statutes come into effect. It is reported that a committee composed of
three disinterested knowledgeable persons will advise the Minister on when
such licenses should be granted [109].
Aside from banks' securities business, the new Bank Law expressly provides
lending limits [110]. The limits are left to cabinet order and ministerial rule
but, compared with the present situation where lending limits are imposed by
so-called administrative guidance [11], it would be fair to say that the rule of
law principle expanded its scope. The new Bank Law also stipulates stricter
requirements regarding banks' loans to directors than those imposed by the
Commercial Code [112].

7. Conclusion
The Bank Law of 1981 and relevant amendments to the Securities and
Exchange Law achieved progress in that they made clear the extent to which
banks may engage in the securities business. Also, it is an improvement that
banks are subject to the same securities regulations insofar as they engage in
securities business. Unlike the United States, where bank regulators and the
securities agency (SEC) are quite separate [113], both banks and securities
companies are regulated by the Ministry of Finance in Japan, although
day-to-day supervision is carried out by separate bureaus. This ensures equality in competitive conditions between the two industries.
On the other hand, the 1981 reform was, like almost all legislation, a
product of political compromise. In order to establish a durable legal system
regarding banks' involvement in securities business, it is necessary to have a
persuasive policy goal based upon empirical studies and theoretical analysis.
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*

In the romanized Japanese in these notes. an accent above a letter (e.g. i. 6. 6) indicates a long
vowel.
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